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ABSTRACT
Network Management (NM) is concerned with reducing complexity and managing cost.
The traditional NM tools and techniques are based on the Open System Interconnection
(OSI) NM model. However, several drawbacks have been identified when managing a
network using traditional NM tools (Sarkar & Verma, 2001).
Network security is a major issue when managing a network. Even though the
technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly managed, the security
measures may not do the job as expected.
The State Model (SM) diagram is a new method, which may assists in managing the
network. This new method may provide functionality not currently offered by current
NM tools. Furthermore it may be possible to integrate the SM with NM tools. SM
diagrams integrate relevant output from devices with protocol finite state information by
means of tables. The diagrams are modu]ar and hierarchical thereby providing top down
decomposition by means of levelling. Furthermore, their modular, hierarchical
characteristics allow technical detail to be introduced in an integrated and controlled
manner.
The State Model Diagrams were evaluated as a network management tool by twenty
participants. The results clearly demonstrated that these diagrams could be of value not
only as a NM tool but also as a tool for network security management.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the study

Network Management
Deri, L. (1996, para 1) states that, "The increasing complexity and heterogeneity of
modem networks has pushed industry and research towards a single and consistent way
of managing networks". In general, network management is a service that employs a
wide variety of software and hardware products to assist network system administrators
in monitoring and maintaining networks. Due to heavy demands for quick and efficient
telecommunication services, active telephone network management first began in the
mid-1920s with the establishment of regional Traffic Control Bureaus in Chicago,
Cleveland and New York. These bureaus served as clearinghouses for all information
affecting traffic over their portion of the network. Staff implemented management plans
for coping with unusual calling patterns, weather, damaged lines or other emergency
situations. The structure of these early network management systems have influenced
current computer network management (AT&T., 2005).
Most network management architectures use the same basic structure and set of
relationships (Figure-1). Computer systems and other network devices run software that
enable them to send alerts when they recognize problems. When receiving these alerts,
management entities are programmed to react by executing one, several, or a group of
actions, including operator notification, event logging, system shutdown, and automatic
attempts at system repair (Cisco Systems, 2002).

'
,.
----..-----�----·
-·--,.-·----·�·

Figure 1: A Typical N�twork Management Architecture Maintains Many Relationships.
(Cisco Systems, 2002, p. 2)
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However, many organizations did not take NM seriously until the development of
computer networks in the early 1980s. In 1998, a group of telecommunication vendors
combined to come to an agreement on simplified specifications that could speed up the
implementation of Open System Interconnection (OSI) management standards and
reduce the difficulty involved in the NM of computer networks (Raman, 1998).
Network Security
Network security is the protection of networks and their services from unauthorized
modification, destruction, or admission (Information Assurance Division, 2004).
Protection methods help to stop unauthorized users from accessing any part of the
network system. It guarantees that a network performs its critical functions correctly.
According to Bose, (cited in 3COM Corporation, 2005, para. 5):

Security must permeate the entire network, not just at key points -- which tends
to leave much of the network and its various points of connection unguarded and
untouched. Furthermore, key points of vulnerability and threats that have
multiple means of propagation require an integrated response from more than
one type of security technology, in essence requiring a multi-layered protection.
Clearly, multiple layers of protection across the whole network are essential if the
integrity of the network is to be protected. Furthermore, according to Brahce, (cited in
Kammerer, 2005, para 16) "Security is really a balance of security versus access". The
challenge is to manage the correct level of security and access.
In current network security management, a common mistake 1s to assume that
protection is just a matter of having the right security products and infrastructure.
According to Stoiler (2005, para. 3),
The marketing literature that goes along with the firewalls, anti-virus software
and VPNs (virtual private networks) certainly give the impression that once the
product is installed, all will be well. But the real challenges lurking beneath the
surface are people issues, not technology issues.
Even though the technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly managed,
the security software may not do the job as expected. Therefore the only safe solution is
to ensure that employees maintain and manage network security properly. This can be
done by ensuring the security devices are configured properly, ongoing monitoring of
the network and patches are consistently installed and updated (Stoller, 2005).
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State Model Diagrams

The State Model (SM) diagrams were designed to provide network students with a
conceptual model to maximize their understanding of the network. There is evidence
that it can also be used for managing security firewalls (Maj & Kohli, 2004). Work to
date indicates that it is diagrammatic, allowing network administrators to have .a
complete picture of the network and to view the physical as well as logical network
topologies. The model employs multiple views, and hence provides a hierarchical top
down decomposition, thereby controlling technical detail. This new SM diagrams may
integrate with NM tools, therefore network administrators may have a better
understanding of networking devices and view of the network. Hence, SM may lead to
efficient NM.
1.2 Purpose of the study
Network management software gives centralized control of the network components to
the network administrator which helps to increase the physical control of the network.
Managing a network through traditional NM tools is generally automatic and not
defensive. The problems are rectified and the network manager only becomes aware of
the problem after seeing the effect on a specific service. By this time half the damage is
already done (Sarkar & Verma, 2001).
Biswas (cited in Sarkar & Verma, 2001, para. 5) says "The biggest drawback of several
NM solutions available on the market is that while most tools support a good breadth of
devices, they lack the depth to which they can manage or monitor a device". Since more
applications are being implemented over networks, each with their own unique
requirements from the network, the devices have to be modified to perform optimally in
demanding and critical environments. In order to use the same tools all over the
network, network administrators require tools that give them depth of management.
According to Maj, Murphy and Kohli (2004), many network administrators use the
Command Line Interface (CLI) to manage their network devices. In order to determine
device (router etc) states a number of different CLI commands must be used. The
complexity of the CLI affects the learning phase for novices, resulting in a lack of
ability to use it to manage most of the network devices (Maj & Kohli, 2004). With a
good network and system analyser, network administrators may know exactly what
traffic is on the network and precisely how the applications and systems are used. A
good network and system analyser allows managers and operators to visualise and
3

respond to service availability trends in real time. This research will investigate whether
the State Model diagrams can use for successful NM.
1.3 Hypothesis
State Model diagrams assist m network security management and lead to more
comprehensive network management.
1.4 Research Questions
1. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of current network management
tools?
2. Does the State Model diagram assist m network security management to
simplify the complexity of the networks and as a result leads to more efficient
network management?
3. Can the State model be integrated into a vendor based system to simplify
network management?
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 General literature
Network Management

In order to guarantee sufficient levels of performance and reliability, computer and
communication systems require increasingly more complicated management strategies.
IT departments are under increasing pressure when the network is at risk from outside
threats such as viruses or software audits (Novell Releases ZENworks 7, 2005).
The rapid expansion of net-based business communications is driving larger amounts of
different types of traffic over increasingly complex enterprise infrastructures.
Unfortunately, NM budgets are not increasing at a rate that is comparative with this
increase in traffic or the challenge of managing these more complex network
environments. Also there are not enough skilled people available to solve current NM
problems (Liebmann, 2000). Hence, the deployments of efficient NM tools are more
critical than ever.
The monitoring tools can be simple or complicated. However, they are all likely to be
simple to access and use. When there is a bad network link, there is no time to spend on
complex analysis or complicated tools when the major concern is to get the systems
back on line quickly (Cohen, 2002).
Tyminski (cited in Lais & Sarni, 2000) comments on NM:
I figured out that to manage systems just for one of the data centres, you'd need
to watch 18 separate consoles. An alarm could flash across the screen, and
unless you happened to be watching that monitor at that moment, you'd miss it.
(p. 8)
Hence, complexity and incompatibility are the foundation of most NM problems in
modem corporate networks. The complexity is created when any hardware addition
increases the points of potential network failure. Incompatibility occurs when IT
hardware is not carefully inventoried and placed inappropriately and indelicately on the
network. This scenario allows the administrator to see the status of all systems in real
time and all on a single console (Lais & Sarni, 2000). However, building a flexible and
dynamic NM platform upon which complicated management functions can guarantee
uninterruptible, high-quality services is very difficult (Jingsha & Yi-Shang, 1995).
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Kahani and Beadle point out that there are three basic approaches for NM systems;
centralised,. hierarchical and distributed. Most NM systems are centralised. Therefore,
only a single management machine which is a single point of failure can collect the
information and controls the entire network. If it fails, the entire network may collapse.
If the management host does not fail, but a fault partitions the network, the other part of
the network is left without any management functionality. In addition, a centralised
system cannot easily be extended when the size or complexity of the network increase
(Kahani & Beadle, 1997).
Network Management Models
Several NM models have been developed to date. Popular NM models are:
1. OSI Network Management
2. Telecommunications Management Networks
3. OMNIPoint theory
4. IT Infrastructure Library
5. Tasks--Frame of reference
6. DUneT Management Model (Hemmen, 2000).
OSI Network Management
The International Organization for Standardization network management model, Open
System Interconnection (OSI), is the primary means for understanding the major
functions of �1vf systems. There are three basic components that comprise the elements
of the management architecture to support a successful NM environment: a functional
component, an information component and a communication component. The
functional component describes the various activities to be performed in support of
management. This component consists of five theoretical areas which facilitate rapid
and consistent progress on each category in individual areas. These are configuration,
fault, .Performance, security and accounting management. The information component
explains how the management information is exchanged between the managing and
managed systems. In order to enable successful transfer and interpretation of
management information,

the

communication

component addresses

support

infrastructure capabilities (Raman, 1998).
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The traditional diagram that explains the manager and agent roles (Figure 2), presents a
view that includes the three components mentioned above. The functional component is
the alarm surveillance. The communication component is addressed by requests and
responses, while the information component is represented by managed resources
(Raman, 1998).

Figure 2: OSI systems management overview.
(Raman, 1998, p. 47).
However, Tanenbaum (cited in OSI Model, n.d.) argues that the OSI protocol 1s
inappropriate because,
...the failure of the OSI suite to become popular was due to bad timing, bad
technology, bad implementations, and bad politics. The timing was bad because
the model was finished only after a significant amount of research time and
money had been spent on the TCP/IP model. The technology is "bad" because
the session and presentation layers are nearly empty, whereas the data link layer
is overfilled. Early implementations were notoriously buggy and in the early
days, OSI became synonymous with poor quality, whereas early
implementations of TCP/IP were more reliable. Finally, the politics were bad
because TCP/IP was closely associated with Unix, making it popular in
academia, whereas OSI did not have this association. (para. 31)
Telecommunications Management Networks (TMN).
TMN is an important development in the telecommunication service providers' world.
In large distributed telecommunications networks fault, configuration, accounting,
performance, and security services are all significant elements of managing critical
resources. The TMN concepts have been commonly implemented to manage networks
ranging from high-speed fiber-optic networks to distributed cellular and satellite based
wireless communication systems (Telecommunications Management Networks, n.d.).
In order to provide an organization with management services, TMN uses a five layer
hierarchy of services. These layers include:

11-08)
rrtified

•

Business Management

•

Service Management

• Network Management
• Element Management
• Network Element (Telecommunications Management Networks, n.d.).
TMN describes the NM architecture in more detail than the OSI model. The NM
architecture is expanded in the TMN model, where the OSI functional areas are used to
define one of the four layers (Hemmen, 2000). However, the TMN model addresses the
functions within a discipline, such as fault or configuration. Therefore, the TMN builds
a stack of functions that can often be over-kill for a service provider. Furthermore, most
Operational Support Systems (OSS's) do not cleanly map to the TMN model, making
the model even more of a burden on the development and deployment process. In
addition further limitations ofTMN are;
•

Lacks the flexibility required for approaching iterative services.

• Not regarded the legacy which has provided the foundation for many Service
Providers (Gillen, n.d.).
OMN/Point theory

Open Management Interoperability Point (OMNIPoint) can be defmed as " ... a set of
standards, implementation specifications, testing methods and tools, and object libraries
that make possible the development of interoperable management systems and
applications" (Hemmen, 2000, p. 303). It provides terms for the basic infrastructure to
implement open management of networks. Further more OMNIPoint architecture is
built by defining actions and their common relationships, which are essential for NM.
However, OMNIPoint theory does not define the actual management applications
themselves. Even though OMNIPoint defines the elements that must be implemented to
achieve the effective exchange of management information, the detailed functions to be
performed by particular management applications are not defined by OMNIPoint
(Hemmen, 2000).
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IT Infrastructure Library
According to Dubie (2002, para. 2), "The Information Technology Infrastructure
Library (ITIL) is a set of rules for how to deliver information technology (IT) services
more efficiently by improving management processes across IT departments that
support networks, applications, databases and systems". ITIL describes IT infrastructure
as the total technological components, the system and application software, the
documentation and all the procedures that are essential to realise one or more IT
services. Each of the processes and objects is described in a module and in each module
a reference is made to other modules that are related to the process or object described
by that module. The ITIL module 'Network Services Management' describes processes
and their common relationships. Generally these processes and their common
relationships are related to the infrastructure (IT). Hence, these processes can be used to
define a design for NM (Hemmen, 2000).
However, limitations of ITIL are described as follows:
•

Lack of management commitment; ITIL takes time and a lot of process change.

•

Complexity; IT staff will get overwhelmed if break each ITIL process into large
steps.

•

Poor work instructions; ITIL gives guidance, but it doesn't tell how to actually
do anything.

• Misdirected metrics; Need to measure quality, not just performance.
•

Diminished momentum; Need to develop achievable goals that keep this in mind
(Worthen, 2005).

Tasks-Frame of reference (T-FORce)
According to Hemmen (2000), T-FORce is defined as offering methods, models and
techniques for managing information systems. This requires managing, controlling and
maintaining implemented information systems. The following concepts are considered
in the T-FORce model:
•

Tasks, task areas, task fields.

• Levels of management.
9

•

Forms of management.

•

The logo ofMintzberg.

Tasks can recognise processes and these tasks can be grouped to form a process. From
a NM perspective the weakness of T-Force is that its primary focus is upon information
systems rather than networks. Networks are defined as a part of an information system;
therefore T-FORce model is only fairly applicable to NM. Hence, not all tasks that are
considered in T-FORce model apply to NM (Hemmen, 2000).
DUneT Management Model
The purpose of the DUneT Management Model is to order the different network
services and to describe service interfaces. This model describes the functions that are
essential for data communications. The DUneT Management Model is a layered model.
In order to assist the understanding of a service that is essential to carry out the service
in the layer above, each lower layer offers a service. Furthermore, in all layers a service
provider can offer its own network services (Hemmen, 2000).
However, according to Terplan (1988), DUneT model does not describe NM
architecture, NM functions, NM instrumentation, Organisational components or
Organisational approach.
In conclusion, Hemmen (2000) states that for the above described models:
None of the models are adequate to model evolving heterogeneous networks,
due to the following definitions:
•

None of the models presently available deal with the evolution of
networks, but they cover heterogeneity. All vendors and users are aware
of the necessity for open systems in which hardware and software can be
connected and can interact. Evolution of the network and network
services has received less attention. It is initiated by such driving forces
as economics, Organizational and technical forces.

•

The models described use a top-down approach only instead of a mixture
of a top-down and a bottom-up approach. With the top-down approach is
meant that architecture for NM is recognized, without considering the
actual realization in detail of that architecture in practice. NM is
described at an abstract level, where details are not recognized.

•

The models are impracticable for managers at a strategic and tactical
level. Those described were selected for their focus on the Organization
of NM, Many other models exist which focus only on technical aspects
of NM. The technical focus of those models implies the influence of the
10

operational level due to the professional knowledge that is required to
perform NM. Due to a lack and deficiencies of present instruments in
providing information for senior management, management is not able to
control NM effectively. (p. 313)
The available models focus mainly on the technical aspects of NM that are part of the
operational NM. Due to the. huge investments and the strategic importance of the
network and its services, decisions concerning the network and its services must be
made by senior management. However, none of the above models, methods or
techniques are available to assist managers with these decisions. Thereby it is necessary
to invent models and provide methods to further develop effective NM (Hemmen,
2000).
Protocols for Network Management
The protocols used by the NM tools play a significant role in the management arena.
The first detailed NM tool was the Simple Gateway Monitoring Protocol (SGMP),
introduced in 1987. While SGMP can monitor gateways, still was not a general purpose
tool. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) came along a year later, but only
for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks. In 1993, SNMP
was extended to use AppleTalk and Novell lnc.'s Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX)
protocols. However, SNMP is extremely difficult to implement and not very efficient.
Even though SNMP is widely available and interoperable amongst a variety of network
components, it wastes considerable bandwidth relaying unnecessary information (Kay,
2002).
In addition, the following are further limitations of SNMP.
•

May not be suitable for management of truly large networks because of
polling performance limitations.

•

Not well suited for retrieving large amounts of data (entire routing table).

•

Traps are unacknowledged (could be lost based on UDP/IP).

•

Only trivial authentication in base protocol--better for monitoring than
control.

•

Only way to trigger an event is to set a variable (rather than having a
remote procedure call like interface)

•

Does not support manager-to-manager communications (Worcester
Polytechnic Institute, 2004, para. 40).
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While the OSI NM model addresses some of the above issues, but it is widely believed
that size of the specification is too complicated and its full functionality has taken long
time to implement (Worcester Polyteclmic Institute, 2004).
Remote Network Monitoring (RMON) is another protocol that was used for NM.
RMON is designed to collect information about the network itself. A single
· management station can monitor multiple segments through distributed monitoring.
Then in the mid-1990s, the more powerful and secure Common Management
Information Protocol (CMIP) was developed to replace SNMP (Kay, 2002). However,
"The fact that CMIP uses 10 times the network overhead has meant that SNMP is still
the major player in the industry" (Kay, 2002, p. 48).
Network Security Management
The best way to balance network secrµity threats is to predict things before they occur
and to expect the unexpected (Kammerer, 2005). Hence, according to Lynas (cited in
Lawson, 2005, p. 45) "Spend absolutely every penny you need to on security but not a
penny more". In order to manage the various firewalls, Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) and other security devices, it is better to have security specialists because security
occurs at a very specific location on the network and has a very specific function.
Furthermore, the boundary of security is absorbent, and therefore, security needs to be
applied at the application level, at the network level and at the storage level (Cummings,
2005).
According to Levine (2005), most compames are increasingly adopting wireless
communications for their employees. Wireless options often may permit an avoidance
of security policies, intentionally or unintentionalJy since most employees remain
uneducated or undereducated about the possibilities of security violations. Therefore,
according to Markovich (cited in Levine, 2005, p. 54) "Malware and hackers target
WLANs (wireless local area networks) because they are the new low-hanging fruit of
the IT world. It's relatively easy to exploit an open AP or divert a laptop to a hacker's
wireless device".
While there are many types of wireless threats, some are exacerbated by improper
employee use. Sometimes internal violations occur because employees knowingly
compromise the network, they are careless or they simply do not understand how to
keep transmissions seoµre. Increase employee awareness training and emphasize written
12

security policies are basic solutions to prevent security breaches in wireless networks
(Levine, 2005).
In the professional IT environment not all threats are technical in nature. Physical
security is as important as technological security. There are two general classifications
of physical threats, malicious and non-malicious. Malicious threats include attempts to
break into the network and non-malicious threats arise when a good person makes a
mistake. However, both threats can be tackled with effective physical security (Gilmer,
2005).
There are several threats that may cause problems when connecting to the Internet.
Some of these are port probes, viruses and worms, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks,
Ping of Death (PoD) attacks, and Universal Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attacks.
Proper management knowledge is a key factor in fighting off these attacks, while well
managed firewalls and routers can protect core networks (Gilmer, 2005).
Commercial systems which commonly use remote access are open to major security
risks. Remote access puts responsive data on the outside of the company firewall
usually on various movable devices that are difficult to control. In order to ensure a high
security environment, companies need to have resources and processes, consistently and
thoroughly in place, as well as much better security management methods (Stoller,
2005).
State Model Diagrams
According to Maj and Kohli (2004, p. 136-214) "Models are a means of controlling
detail and complexity. Desirable model characteristics include; diagrammatic, self
documenting, easy to use and hierarchical top down decomposition to control detail". A
good model, levels the processes by which complex systems can be progressively
decomposed, whilst still maintaining essential links. Maj and Kohli (2004) proposed
that intemetworking devices (switches, routers etc) could be diagrammatically
represented using a collection of tables called state model diagrams. These diagrams
have been successfully used for teaching intemetworking technology curriculum.
As a pedagogical tool the state diagrams explicitly incorporate the TCP/IP and OSI
stacks (Figure 3), however for experienced administrators they may be removed.
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Figure 3: Router State Model. (Maj, Kohli and Fetherston, 2005, p. 2)
The modular nature of the diagrams provides a top down decomposition by means of
levelling. According to Maj, Kohli and Fetherston (2005):
One of the most important features of these diagrams is the ability to construct a
variety of different levels according to the level of abstraction required. This
means that the initial (level 0) diagram can be consulted to obtain a high level
overview of device interconnectivity i.e. what switches and routers are
connected together. When details of a specific device are needed, then greater
technical complexity for that specific device can be obtained. Obviously, the
different levels of diagram are consistent. The diagrams may be decomposed to
the level that is meaningful for the purpose that the diagram is required.
This may be illustrated by a router OSI layer 1 line status (carrier detect table). For the
purposes of NM, it is not appropriate to decompose this further - the interface is either
up or down. Furthermore, a simple routing protocol e.g. RIP may be represented by a
level 3 routing table (Figure 3). Significantly, this same basic state model used for a
router running RIP may be also be used for other more complex routing protocol such
as Enhanced Interior I.louting Protocol (EIGRP).
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According to Maj, Kohli and Fetherston (2005):
It is possible, using the switch state model, to implement protocols that include:
basic switch operation (address learning, forwarding/filtering), Spanning Tree,
Virtual LAN's (VLANs), trunking, VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP) and Ether
channelling.
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Figure 4: Switch State Model. (Maj, Kohli and Fetherston, 2005, p. 2)
Significantly, hyperlinks may be used to navigate between not only different devices but
also different tables in the same device.
According to Maj, Ratnayake & Tran (2005) state model diagrams of a wireless Access
Point and a PIX firewall were developed. The wireless Access Point (AP) state model
(Figure 5) consists of an association table, radio interface table and cable interface
(Ethernet) table. The association table provides IP to MAC address associations. The
radio interface table allows identification of the radio interface (e.g. 802. lla, 5GHz),
the SSID and authentication parameters.
Stateful packet filters combine the best of packet filtering and proxy filtering
technologies. Stateful packet filters maintain complete session state information for
each session. Each time an IP connection is established (inbound or outbound), the
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information is logged in a stateful session flow table. For this research study, a Private
Internet exchange (PIX) stateful packet filter (firewall) was used. PIX firewalls
employed dedicated hardware (ensuring high performance) and use the Adaptive
Security Algorithm (ASA) for stateful connection control. The ASA uses the concept of
security levels - security level 100 being the highest and is assigned to an inside
interface. Security level O is the lowest and is assigned to an outside interface. PIX
devices may have more than two interfaces, in which case these may be assigned
different levels of security.

AP1200-1

IP

MAC

Device

Interface

dot11radio1

SSID

Group2

Authentication

Open

Channel Frequency
Interface

Narre

Parent

State

40 (5200M-lz)

BhemelO

IP
MAC

Figure 5: Wireless Access Point State Model.

(Maj, S. P., Ratnayake, S. A., & Tran, B., 2005, p. 3)
High (inside) to low (outside) security may be enabled by two different methods - static
or dynamic translation. Dynamic translation employs a global address pool and Network
Address Translation (NAT). The PIX firewall state model diagram (Figure 6) shows a
static translation. However, it is possible to also model dynamic translation. This PIX
state model diagram incorporates the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), route and
interface tables. It also includes the Xlate table that provides the local to global IP
address translation and the "conn" table identifies the two end devices being connected.
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Figure 6: PIX Firewall State Model.
(Maj, S. P., Ratnayake, S. A., & Tran, B., 2005, p. 4)
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3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Identification of Variables Impacting on the Hypothesis
In order to avoid errors, repetitive measurements have been taken and the results were
based on practical experiments. The experiments data that collected relied upon the
responses of the software and hardware in the network and research data that collected
relied upon the responses from research participants.
3.2 Targeted Population
•

Network managers and administrators searching for ways to minimize costs and
complexity when managing the network.
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4.0 MATERIALS AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION
4.1 Description of Materials to be employed
The following equipment was used for the research investigation:
•

Ciscoworks 2000 NM application

•

Computers: Intel Pentium N machines with 512 MB of RAM

•

Operating systems: Windows XP, Windows 2003 advanced server and
Red hat Linux 9.0 operating systems

•

Routers: Cisco 2600 series routers, running IOS version 12.2

•

Switches (Layer 2): Catalyst 2950 wire-speed 24 ports Fast Ethernet
switches, running IOS version 21.1

•

Switches (Layer 3): Catalyst 3550 multi-layer switches with 24-port
10/100 switch and GBIC-based Gigabit Ethernet ports will be use to
experiment with multicasting, running IOS version 21.1

•

Wireless Access Point: Aironet 1200 Access Point, operate in 802.lla
band through 5 GHz transmission, running- running IOS version 12.2.

•

Pix firewall: Pix 5l5e with 3 interfaces supporting VPN and 3DES
encryption.

•

Wireless Client Adapter: Aironet 802.1la/b/g wireless PCI adapter.

•

Intel Pro 10/100 Mbps network interface cards.

The School of Computer and Information Science at Edith Cowan University had all the
equipment to perform the investigation. The network equipment in the labs was up-to
date and standardised for both education and commercial environments. Therefore this
investigation provided valuable information about the network environment.
4.2 Design and Procedure of the Study
This investigation involved examining the results provided by the NM application. A
direct measurement n;iethod was used for this investigation because it was application
specific (Ori, 2002).
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Stallings (1993) stated that NM can be measured in 2 steps:
Step 1: Network monitoring - a read function, concerned with observing and
analyzing status and behaviors of the configurations and its components.
Step 2: Network control - a write function, concerned with altering parameters
of various components in the network.
In order to achieve accurate measurements, multiple network configurations
implemented for the evaluation. The experiments were conducted only in a Local Area
Network (LAN) environment. The initial investigation involved examining simple
network configurations which was used afterwards as a baseline. Afterwards, the
baseline used to assess more complex network configurations. The experimental
configurations are as follows:
LAN Configurations
(Refer to Appendix C for the configuration commands)
PG 1

&
�eO

PC2

PIX1

Ciscoworks Server

Figure 7: Experiment 1, baseline experiment with single Internetworking device
(firewall).

Ciscoworks Server

Figure 8: Experiment 2 with multiple Internetworking devices (router, firewall)
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Figure 9: Experiment 3 with multiple Intemetworking devices (router, firewall and
switch)
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Figure 10: Experiment 4 with multiple Intemetworking devices (router, firewall,
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. Figure 11: Experiment 5 with multiple Intemetworking devices in the LAN.
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In order to achieve maximum accuracy and reliability, the evaluation compared and
contrasted based on the three parameters as in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Network management evaluation procedures
1. State Model: Managing the network using the SM
2. Automate: Use CiscoWorks to evaluate NM.
3. Manual: Use Command Line Interface (CLI).
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Figure 13: Evaluating the effectiveness of NM using the SM and Ciscoworks
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4.3 Data Collection

After above experiments were implemented, a questionnaire (refer to Appendix A) was
given to selected network experts and network students to evaluate State Model
diagrams with Ciscoworks and CLI. Also was data collected by face to face interview
with network experts to provide more in depth data (refer to Appendix B). Feedbacks on
the effectiveness of managing the network evaluated.
4.4 Ethical Considerations

Participants were informed in writing that all original records would be stored in a
locked room at Edith Cowan University and that the anonymity of the participants was
guaranteed. A permission form signed by every participant prior to participate in the
study. The interviewees were notified that their voices will be recorded only for study
purposes. Participants were quite at ease during the study and enjoyed being part of the
study.
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5.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS
5.1 An Evaluation of State Model Diagrams
Based on the experimental networks, twenty participants experienced in networking
were asked to evaluate the following NM tools:
•

State model diagrams (paper based only)

•

Ciscoworks for Windows

•

Command Line Interface

The participants were given a short introduction to the state model diagrams and
provided with the opportunity to manage the network using these tools. They were then
asked to complete a questionnaire and participate to interviews to obtain details about
their work experience. The questionnaire and interview also included a number of
questions most of which were based on the Likert scale (SA, A, D, SD, U) and the
opportunity to provide any comments.
Question 1
Does the state model provide an easy way to understand the relationship between the
devices of a network?
Yes
100%

Do not know

No

Question 2
The state model allows network administrators to have a better view of the entire
network than other methods/models.

1sD \u

5%

Question 3
The state model cannot be used to manage complex networks.
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Question 4
The integration of the state model with Ciscoworks simplifies the complexity of the
network.

/ sn

u

J 20%

J

Question 5
The state model does NOT assist efficient NM.

Question 6
The state model assists in network security management as a tool and as a result leads to
more successful NM.

Question 7
I would NOT use the state model to manage my network.

All the responses to the request for any comments were recorded and are as follows:
Participant 1
"Yes, state diagrams provide a clear, concise view of a network confi guration
which helps identify any security issues".
Participant 2
"Because the state model show you all the information in one go it would allow
a better understanding of the network which in turn provides better security".
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Participant 3
"I have not previously seen a state model in my studies. I think it could have
been useful if I had been exposed to it earlier. In the last unit I am studying
called network troubleshooting, I think it provides an additional mechanism not
only to troubleshoot but to be able to manage the security risks. I think the
appropriate niche for this type of model will be in software where this
information could be juxta positioned with statistics or breach attempts and
intrusions whereby alters could be provided in these instances".
Participant 4
"State model gives a clear picture of each item/component and its configuration
values. This model could be developed or further developed which can lead to a
view/idea about each component. Saves time when it comes to working out
network issues. Rather than using the command line method to view
configuration values. Disadvantages are manual/paper based system can be
damaged or lost".
Participant 5
"State model provides a layman's view where it is simple and easy to understand
the network".
Participant 6
"Yes, this will help to identify any bugs in the design".
Participant 7
"State model provides clear understanding and creates a clear picture about the
network. It will help to identify any bugs or faulty points in the network. I
strongly believe this approach will lead to a world class product".
Participant 8
"Easy to understand the structure of the network and information flow through
the separate interfaces which strongly helps to understand security needs".
Participant 9
"State model gives a clear overview of the entire network including IP
addresses, MAC addresses and all other relevant information. It helps a lot to
understand the security needs of the system, and exact interfaces to put all
ACLs".
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Participant 10
"State model manages the network well but it does not address the security
issues".
Participant 11
"State model is useful to efficiently manage the complexity of networks".
Participant 12
"State model is very good method of understanding the entire network but if the
network becomes complex it will be very cumbersome or difficult to understand
the state model and hence the network".
Participant 13
"State Model diagrams provide clear picture of the entire network. That will
help to identify any faulty points in the network. I strongly believe this method
provides an efficient network security management".
Participant 14
"This State Model is good for getting a good view of the network. However,
further develop need".
Participant 15
"State Model might help to identify security if logs showing success of
authorised traffic and unautherised attempts are identified regardless of success
or other status. However, looks feasible, would need to be confirmed with
logged attempts to degrade or bypass security".
Participant 16
"State Model clearly shows what sort of security permissions have given to the
network".
Participant 17
"State Model might help to identify security risk by inserting extra fields to
cover things like authentication methods, access list settings etc".
Participant 18
"Yes, State Model shows all information as a map rather than documentation. It
is focus on the key points of the network".
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Participant 19
"For a secure network we need understand how it works. SM is a map we can
look at to understand rather than read. SM is extremely helpful for beginners
because it identifies all the necessary information that beginner wants to learn.
Further development need to manage complex network".
Participant 20
"SM brings out the major points and less complex. Showing Access Control List
(ACL) information is very helpful. SM has a potential value and very useful
edition to other network management tools. So it is important but would not
relay only to the State Model, combination with Ciscoworks give better network
management. It is a additional tool rather than a tool".
This is only a limited study based on a simple LAN with only twenty participants.
However, the results are consistent. Of the twenty participants only one had reservations
about the using the state model as a NM tool.
5.2 Further Research

In this study, the state model diagrams were paper based. A hyperlink implementation is
currently being developed. This will allow users to more easily navigate between
different devices and include or exclude detail as needed. A more extensive study
involving a more complex network and more interviewees is currently being planned.
5.3 Limitation of the Study
This study was not based upon the NM tools or vendor specific NM tools. However,
the author aware of the number of NM tools on the market and interoperability issues.
The primary objectives of the research were to investigate the efficiency of NM tools
and the integration of the State Model diagrams with Ciscmvorks and its effectiveness
for security and effective NM.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
There are numerous NM tools available on the market, but complexities increased when
they are used to manage or monitor a device. Even though various NM models and
methods were introduced to reduce complexity, many studies indicate that this is in fact,
not the case. Network security is a critical issue of modem NM. Even though the
technology assists to reduce security risks, poor NM may mean that the network is
insecure. Therefore the only safe solution is ensuring employees have the skills and
understanding to maintain and manage network devices and security properly.
Most of the NM devices use CLI which requires a good understanding and experience
of the device to manage it. Lack of understanding reduces the likelihood of successful
NM even if the right NM model or method is used. The SM approach includes
implementation details derived from CLI commands, hence it is possible to easily verify
and validate device operations. The research results clearly demonstrated that these
models are diagrammatic and easy to use. Hence, using these models to document a
network it is relatively easy to understand the purpose and structure of the devices. The
state models employ leveling and hence provide hierarchical top down decomposition
thereby controlling technical detail. This leads to more efficient NM. An evaluation of
state model diagrams as a NM tool clearly demonstrated that it provided documentation,
functionality not found in either the Command Line Interface or a standard NM tool. It
also provided that the State model can integrated into a vendor based system to simplify
network management. Finally new, diagrammatic State Model diagrams are very useful
for secure NM environment.
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APPENDIX A
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
For all queries, please contact:
Research Ethics Officer
Edith Cowan University
100 Joondalup Drive
JOONDALUP WA 6027
Phone: 6304 2170
Fax:
6304 2661

12 November 2005,
Information Letter for the Questionnaire

Dear Participant,
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study of an investigation of
Network Security Management Methods which I am conducting as a part of my
Bachelor of Science Honours (Computer Science) degree in the School of
Communication, Health and Science ,at Edith Cowan University, under the supervision
of Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj. I would like to provide you with more information
about this project and what your involvement would result in if you decide to take part.
Network Management (NM) is concerned with reducing complexity and managing cost.
The traditional NM tools and techniques are based on the Open System Interconnection
(OSI) NM model. However, several drawbacks have been identified when managing a
network using traditional NM tools. Network security is a major issue when managing a
network. Even though the technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly
managed, the security measures may not do the job as expected. In order to manage the
network easily, network administrators must have a good knowledge of the network
devices and their operation. Though, most Intemetworking devices are generally based
on the Command-Line Interface (CLI). The complexity of the CLI affects the learning
phase, which may result in the lack o ability to manage the device.
State Model (SM) is a new method, which may assists in managing the network. This
new method may provide functionality not currently offered by current NM tools.
Furthermore it may be possible to integrate the SM with NM tools. The benefit of the
State model is that it give us the complete picture of the network, another word, it is
diagrammatic, allowing us to view the physical as well as the logical topologies.
The main aim of the research is to find out whether the State model assists in network
security management to simplify the complexity of the networks and as a result leads to
more successful network management.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. The questionnaire will be conduct in the Cisco
Intemetworking laboratory, room 13.134, at Mount Lawley campus. The questionnaire
may take approximately 30 minutes. You have the right not to answer any of the
questions. I promise you will not find this questionnaire as difficult. Furthermore, you
may decide to withdraw from this study at any time.
All information you provide is completely confidential. Your name will not appear in
any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with your permission
anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be kept for a
minimum of 5 years and no one can gain access to the information except my self and
my supervisor Dr. S. P. Maj. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a
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participant in this study. You will have the opportunity to reflect on your own learning
by participating to this study. Also your responses may provide useful information to
the network managers and administrators searching for ways to minimize costs and
complexity when managing the network. Also may helpful to the students on
networking courses.
If you have any questions regarding this research or would like further information to
help you in reaching a decision about participation, please do not hesitate to contact me
.You can also contact my
on
or my email
supervisor, Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj on (
or alternatively you can
email him on p.maj((u,ecu.edu.au . Further, if you have any concerns or complaints about
the research project and wish to talk to an independent person, you may contact:

Research Ethics Officer
Human Research Ethics Officer
Edith Cowan University
100 Joondalup Drive
JOONDALUP WA 6027
Phone: (08) 6304 2170
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au,
If you would like to participate, please sign the fuformed Consent Document and return
it to me.Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Shamila Ratnayake.
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Informed Consent Document
I have read the information presented in the information letter for the study of an
investigation of Network Security Management Methods being conducted by Mr Shamila
Ratnayake of School of Communication, Health and Science at Edith Cowan University. I
have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory
answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted.
I am aware that I have the option of allowing the information from the questionnaire may
be included in the thesis and/or publications to come from this research, with the
understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.
I was informed that all information ,I provide is completely confidential and I may
withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.
I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in
this study, I may contact either project supervisor on
email
p.maj@ecu.edu.au or office of Ethics Research at Edith Cowan University on (08) 6304
2170, email research.ethics@ecu.edu.au.

I, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ freely do agree/ do not agree to participate in this
project.
I do agree/ do not agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication
that comes from this research.

I
Participant's Signature

Date

I
Investigator's Signature

I

I

Date

49

Questionnaire: Network Security Management Methods
01)

What is your job title? Circle one.
a) Network Expert
b) Network Student
c) Other; Please specify _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

02)

Do you have experience in network management area? Circle one.
a) Yes
b) No (Please skip questions 03 and 04. Go directly to question 05)
If Yes: How many years of experience do you have? - - - - - - - - - -

03)

Which methods/ models/ tools you use to manage your network? eg.
Cisco Works

04)

What methods do you use to identify security risks in you network?

(Please skip question 05. Go directly to question 06)
05)

Which kind of experience do you have in the networking field?

06)

Does the State Model provide an easy way to understand the relationships
between the devices of the network? Circle one.
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know
If Yes: Do you think State Model approach helps to identify any security risk?

Below each of the statements presented below, please indicate whether you Strongly
Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD), or are Undecided (U).
07)

The State Model allows network administrators to have a better view of the
entire network than other methods/ models.
SA

08)

A

D

SD

u

The State Model cannot be used to manage complex networks.
SA

A

D

SD

u
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09)

The integration of the State Model with the Cisco Works makes the complexity
of the network easier to understand.
SA

A

D

SD

u

10)

The State Model does not provide efficient network management.

11)

SA
D
u
A
SD
The State Model assists in network security management as a tool and as a result
leads to more successful network management.
SA

12)

D

SD

u

I would not use the State Model to manage my network.
SA

13)

A

A

D

SD

u

Comments:

Thank you very much for your help.
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APPENDIXB

12 November 2005,
Information Letter for the Interview

Dear Participant,
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study of an investigation of
Network Security Management Methods which I am conducting as a part of my
Bachelor of Science Honours (Computer Science) degree in the School of
Communication, Health and Science at Edith Cowan University, under the supervision
of Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj. I would like to provide you with more information
about this project and what your involvement would result in if you decide to take part.
Network Management (NM) is concerned with reducing complexity and managing cost.
The traditional NM tools and techniques are based on the Open System Interconnection
(OSI) NM model. However, several drawbacks have been identified when managing a
network using traditional NM tools. Network security is a major issue when managing a
network. Even though the technology assists to reduce security risks, unless properly
managed, the security measures may not do the job as expected. In order to manage the
network easily, network administrators must have a good knowledge of the network
devices and their operation. Though, most Internetworking devices are generally based
on the Command-Line Interface (CLI). The complexity of the CLI affects the learning
phase, which may result in the lack o ability to manage the device.
State Model (SM) is a new method, which may assists in managing the network. This
new method may provide functionality not currently offered by current NM tools.
Furthermore it may be possible to integrate the SM with NM tools. The benefit of the
State model is that it give us the complete picture of the network, another word, it is
diagrammatic, allowing us to view the physical as well as the logical topologies.
The main aim of the research is to find out whether the State model assists in network
security management to simplify the complexity of the networks and as a result leads to
more successful network management.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. The interview will be conduct in the Cisco
Internetworking laboratory, room 13.134, at Mount Lawley campus. The interview may
take about 30 minutes. You have the right not to answer any of the interview questions.
Furthermore, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time.
With. your permission, I will tape~record your conversation to assist my collection of
data for analysis later. All information you provide is completely confidential. Your
name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with
your permission anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study
will be kept for a minimum of 5 years and no one can gain access to the information
except my self and my supervisor Dr. S. P. Maj. There are no known or anticipated risks
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to you as a participant in this study. You will have the opportunity to reflect on your
own learning by participating to this study. Also your responses may provide useful
information to the network managers and administrators searching for ways to minimize
costs and complexity when managing the network. Also may helpful to the students on
networking courses.
If you have any questions regarding this research or would like further information to
help you in reaching a decision about participation, please do not hesitate to contact me
on
or my email
You can also contact my
supervisor, Associate Professor Dr Paul Maj on
or alternatively you can
email him on p.mai@ecu.edu.au . Further, if you have any concerns or complaints about
the research project and wish to talk to an independent person, you may contact:

Research Ethics Officer
Human Research Ethics Officer
Edith Cowan University
100 Joondalup Drive
JOONDALUP WA 6027
Phone: (08) 6304 2170
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au ·
If you would like to participate, please sign the Informed Consent Document and return
it to me.Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Shamila Ratnayake.
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Informed Consent Document
I have read the information presented in the information letter for the study of an
investigation of Network Security Management Methods being conducted by Mr Shamila
Ratnayake of School of Communication, Health and Science at Edith Cowan University. I
have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory
answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted.
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be tape-recorded and the
information from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to come
from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.
I was informed that all information I provide is completely confidential and I may
withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.
I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in
this study, I may contact either project supervisor on
email
p.maj@ecu.edu.au or office of Ethics Research at Edith Cowan University on (08) 6304
2170, email research.ethics@ecu.edu.au.

I, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ freely do agree/ do not agree to participate in this
project.
I do agree/ do not agree to have my interview tape-recorded.
I do agree/ do not agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication
that comes from this research.

I
Participant's Signature

Date

I
Investigator's Signature

I

I

Date
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Interview Questions: Network Security Management :Methods
01)

What is your job title?
a) Network Expert
b) Network Student
c) Other; Please specify - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

02)

Do you have experience in network management area?
c) Yes
d) No (Please skip questions 03, 04, 05, 06 and 07. Go directly to
question 08)
If Yes: How many years of experience do you have? - - - - - - - - - -

03)

Which methods/ models/ tools you use to manage your network? eg.
CiscoWorks

04)

How often you use these tools'in your day to day work?

05)

Areas in which you use these tools? e.g. connectivity issues, availability, change
configuration etc.

06)

Do you use the tools for reporting to management or fault finding?

07)

What are the issues with current network management tools? eg. Product
specific or generic

(Please skip question 08. Go directly to question 09)
08)

Which kind of experience do you have in the networking field?

09)

Does the State Model provide an easy way to understand the relationships
between the devices of the network?
d) Yes
e) No
f) Do not know
If Yes: Do you think State Model approach helps to identify any security risk?
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Below each of the statements presented below, please indicate whether you Strongly
Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD), or are Undecided (U).
10)

The State Model allows network administrators to have a better view of the
entire network than other methods/ models.
SA

11)

D

SD

u

The State Model cannot be used to manage complex networks.
SA

12)

A

A

D

SD

u

The integration of the State Model with the CiscoWorks makes the complexity
of the network easier to understand.
SA

A

D

SD

u

13)

The State Model does not provide efficient network management.

14)

SA
A
D
SD
u
The State Model assists in network security management as a tool and as a result
leads to more successful network management.
SA

15)

D

SD

u

I would not use the State Model to manage my network.
SA

16)

A

A

D

SD

u

Comments:

Thank you very much for your help.
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APPENDIXC
Experiment 1

CiscoWorks server:
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>)i;~'.g~~g~4:f;i:ttl.:q.j
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-7A-6F-D3
IP Address. . .
192.168.1.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.1.2
PC 1:

C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>ff;ig'g~)}l&"fg)h~
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-B2-3A
IP Address. . .
192.168.2.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.2.2
PC 2:

C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>t3tjlG0B'~':i:.§t'\,Jc~1;i
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-08-24
IP Address. . .
192.168.3.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.3.2

PIX Firewall:
PIXl(config)# ~f:l,£W):i';t;i'.tj
PIX Version 6.3(4)
interface ethernetO lOOfull
interface ethernetl lOOfull
interface ethernet2 lOOfull
nameif ethernetO outside securityO
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO
nameif ethernet2 dmz security50
ip address outside 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0
ip address inside 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0
ip address dmz 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0

static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.1.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0

static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255
0 0
sump-server host inside 192.168.1.1
snmp·-server community public
snmp-server enable traps
end
PIXl (config) # ;J1i~}~@fi17!:~
interface ether:Q.etl "inside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82.5'59 ethernet, address is 0012. d96f. db47
IP address .192.168.1.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
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PIXl (config) # ~gQii~fiii.t· eZ)
interface ethernet2 "dmz" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 000e.Oc66.6bdb
IP address 192.168.2.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIXl (config) # ~nOWC~irit;l~ll
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46
IP address 192.168.3.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIXl(config)# !~~iQ¥t~
inside 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 CONNECT static
dmz 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 1 CONNECT static
outside 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.2 1 CONNECT static
PIXl(config)# i~W~~
outside 192.168.3.1 0002.5573.1167
inside 192.168.1.1 0002.557a.6fd3
dmz 192.168.2.1 0002.5573.b7f2

~ligw-~~

PIXl (config) #
3 in use, 3 most used
Global 192.168.2.99 Local 192.168.1.1
Global 192.168.3.99 Local 192.168.1.1
Global 192.168.3.98 Local 192.168.2.1
PIXl(config)# ~J}~w[cg~~
1 in use, 1 most used
TCP out 192.168.3.1:80 in 192.168.2.1:1325 idle 0:00:31 Bytes 1253
flags UIO
PIXl(config)# ;s~<:>,W.~yat',}£
static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.1.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
static (inside,dmz) 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0

static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255
0 0

Experiment 2

CiscoWorks Server:

C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>i~~~n.Ei~~i;al,~
Windows IP Configuration
00-02-55-7A-1C-39
Physical Address.
192. 168 .1. 1
IP Address . . .
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
192.168.1.2
Default Gateway
PC 1:

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>iP~n~-.1~~1m
Windows IP Configuration
00-02-55-73-06-49
Physical Address.
192.168.2.1
IP Address . . .
255.255.255.0
Subnet Mask . .
192.168.2.2
Default Gateway
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PC 2:
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>::ifJfg-gJfttf1{-1i
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-08-67
IP Address . . .
192.168.2.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.2.2

PIX Firewall:

PIX(config)# ~Ji~~
PIX Version 6.3(4)
interface ethernetO lOOfull
interface ethernetl lOOfull
interface ethernet2 lOOfull
nameif ethernetO outside securityO
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO
nameif ethernet2 dmz security50
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list

ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.3.99 eq WWW
ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.3.98 eq WWW
ACLIN permit icmp any any echo
ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.99 echo-reply
ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.98 echo-reply
ACLIN2 permit tcp any any
ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo
ACLIN2 permit icmp any host 192.168.1.99 echo-reply
ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo-reply

ip address outside 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0
ip address inside 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0
ip address dmz 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.1.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
nat (inside) 1 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 0 0
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255
0 0

static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0

static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.2.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
access-group ACLIN in interface outside
access-group ACLIN2 in interface dmz
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.3.1 1
snmp-server host inside 192.168.1.1
snmp-server community public
snmp-server enable traps
end
PIX(config)# ~~~Ji'§aj
interface ethernetl "inside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db47
IP address 192.168.2.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIX(config)# ~W:~~frti?~
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46
IP address 192.i68.3.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
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PIX (config) # ~hc,~)Ifqit'j;~
outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.3.1 1 OTHER static
dmz 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 CONNECT static
inside 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 1 CONNECT static
outside 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.2 1 CONNECT static
PIX(config)# ~~~~~~~~~
3 in use, 3 most used
Global 192.168.3.99 Local 192.168.2.1
Global 192.168.3.98 Local 192.168.1.1
Global 192.168.1.99 Local 192.168.2.1
PIX(config)# ~~~j;fifj;j
outside 192.168.3.1 000c.309e.6481
inside 192.168.2.1 0002.5573.b7f2
dmz 192.168.1.1 0002.557a.6fd3
PIX (config) # ~fiJ'>WS<'2:A"t'!
1 in use, 6 most used
TCP out 192.168.4.1:80 in 192.168.1.1:1895 idle 0:02:18 Bytes 1253
flags UIO
PIX (config) # ~!iqWi.Stat:i'.;EJ;
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3,.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255
0 0

static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.2.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0

static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.2.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
PIX (config) # ~:gRy;i,.~Jig)'i~~
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.l.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
PIX(config)# it.ifw:~~j
nat (inside) 1 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 0 0
PIX (config) # lff1'li~¥ti;.a2'¢~J£l:t~~~t:f:J
access-list cached ACL log flows: total O, denied O (deny-flow-max
1024)
alert-interval 300
access-list ACLIN; 5 elements
access-list ACLIN line 1 permit tcp any host 192.168.3.99 eq WWW
(hitcnt=7)
QQ
access-list ACLIN line 2 permit tcp any host 10') 1t::Q
eq "f./v"v'wTT//
(hitcnt=7)
access-list ACLIN line 3 permit icmp any any echo (hitcnt=213)
access-list ACLIN line 4 permit icmp any host 192.168.3.99 echo-reply
(hitcnt=l6)
access-list ACLIN line 5 permit icmp any host 192.168.3.98 echo-reply
(hitcnt=l2)
access-list ACLIN2; 4 elements
access-list ACLIN2 line 1 permit tcp any any (hitcnt=l5)
access-list ACLIN2 line 2 permit icmp any any echo (hitcnt=l09)
access-list ACLIN2 line 3 permit icmp any host 192.168.1.99 echo-reply
(hitcnt=28)
acce·ss-list ACLIN2 line 4 permit icmp any any echo-reply (hitcnt=8)
-'-_.,'-

•

.J..U V

•

~

..J

•JV

PIX (config) # t§:ifRWl1~~~c~a'§!F~
access-group ACLIN in interface outside
access-group ACLIN2 in interface dmz
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Router:
Rou ter#$_ll:<>w_'\"ii{"~i'.~/;aj
FastEthernet0/1 is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is OOOc.309e.6481 (bia 000c.309e.6481)
Internet address is 192.168.3.1/24
Rou ter#i~wid.11tr~l~¥~
FastEthernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6480 (bia 000c.309e.6480)
Internet address is 192.168.4.2/24
Rou ter#~iNJ,e:r:ti~
Building configuration ...
hostname Router
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 192.168.4.2 255.255.255.0
interface FastEthernet0/1
ip address 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.0
router rip
network 192.168.3.0
network 192.168.4.0
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enable traps tty
end

C
C

192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
192.168.3.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1

Router# Sf!,Q_W)ti~E
Protocol Address
Internet 192.168.3.99
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.3.98
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.3.2
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.3.1
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.4.1
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.4.2
FastEthernet0/0
Router#

Age (min)
106

Hardware Addr
0012.d96f.db46

Type
ARPA

105

0012.d96f.db46

ARPA

7

0012.d96f.db46

ARPA

OOOc.309e.6481

AP.PA

0002.5573.1167

ARPA

000c.309e.6480

ARPA

7

Interface

Experiment 3:
CiscoWorks Server:
C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>----aif~lc~r~t~
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-40-96-A6-7D-64
IP Address. . .
192.168.4.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default_Gateway
192.168.4.2
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PC 1:
----

c: \Documents

and Settings\Administrator>[i}'])~~li~§'!'i1~1il!
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-7A-81-25
IP Address. . .
192.168.1.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.1.2
PC 2:

C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>iiB~'il!~gJ;~;~;:k~
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-0B-48
IP Address. . .
192.168.3.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.3.2
PIX Firewall:

(***Same configurations for the Experiment 4***)

PIX(config)#
interface ethernetO lOOfull
interface ethernetl lOOfull
interface ethernet2 lOOfull
nameif ethernetO outside securityO
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO
nameif ethernet2 dmz security50
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list

ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.3.99 eq WWW
ACLIN permit tcp any host 192.168.3.98 eq WWW
ACLIN permit icmp any any echo
ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.99 echo-reply
ACLIN permit icmp any host 192.168.3.98 echo-reply
ACLIN2 permit tcp any any
ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo
ACLIN2 permit icmp any host 192 .168 .1. 99 echo-reply
ACLIN2 permit icmp any any echo-reply

ip address outside 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0
ip address inside 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0
ip address dmz 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.l.20 nerm3Qk 2~~.2~~.?~~.n
nat (inside) 1 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 0 0
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255
0 0

static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.4.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 O
0

static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.4.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
access-group ACLIN in interface outside
acce·ss-group ACLIN2 in interface dmz
route inside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.1 1
snmp-server host inside 192.168.4.1
snmp-server community public
snmp-server enabl~ traps
end
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PIX(config)#
inside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.1 1 OTHER static
dmz 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.2 1 CONNECT static
inside 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2 1 CONNECT static
outside 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.3.2 1 CONNECT static
PIX(config)#
interface ethernetl "inside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db47
IP address 192.168.2.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIX (config) #
interface ethernet2 "dmz" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 000e.Oc66.6bdb
IP address 192.168.1.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIX(config)#
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46
IP address 192.168.3.2, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIX(config)#
3 in use, 5 most used
Global 192.168.3.99 Local 192.168.4.1
Global 192.168.3.98 Local 192.168.1.1
Global 192.168.1.99 Local 192.168.4.1
PIX(config)#
outside 192.168.3.1 0002.5573.1167
inside 192.168.2.1 000c.309e.6480
dmz 192.168.1.1 0002.5573.b7f2
PIX(config)#
static (dmz,outside) 192.168.3.98 192.168.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.255
0 0

static (inside,dmz) 192.168.1.99 192.168.4.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 O
0

static (inside,outside) 192.168.3.99 192.168.4.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
PIX(config)#
global (outside) 1 192.168.3.10-192.168.3.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
global (dmz) 1 192.168.1.10-192.168.1.20 netmask 255.255.255.0
PIX(config)#
nat (inside) 1 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 0 0
PIX(config)#
2 in use, 6 most used
TCP out 192.168.1.1:1381 in 192.168.4.1:80 idle 0:00:19 Bytes 1255
flags UIOB
TCP out 192.168.3.1:80 in 192.168.1.1:1382 idle 0:00:11 Bytes 1253
flags UIO
Router: (***Same configurations for the Experiment 4***)

FastEthernetO 1
up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is OOOc.309e.6481 (bia OOOc.309e.6481)
Internet address is 192.168.4.2/24
Router#~)l~~~~j';ilai!g'I
FastEtherrietO/Oi~-~p, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6480 (bia 000c.309e.6480)
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Internet address is 192.168.2.1/24

Protocol Address
Internet 192.168.2.2
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.2.1
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.4.1
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.4.2
FastEthernet0/1

Age (min)
5

5

Hardware Addr
0012.d96f.db47

Type
ARPA

000c.309e.6480

ARPA

0002.557a.6fd3

ARPA

oooc.309e.6481

ARPA

Interface

Codes: C - connected, S - static,
C
S
C
S

192.168.4.0/24
192.168.1.0/24
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.3.0/24

is directly connected, FastEthernet0/1
[1/0] via 192.168.2.2
is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
[1/0] via 192.168.2.2

Router#~~8Wmim
Building configuration ...
hostname Router
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0
interface FastEthernet0/1
ip address 192.168.4.2 255.255.255.0
ip classless
ip route 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2
ip route 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.2
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enable traps tty
end
Switch: (***Same configurations £or the Experiment 4***)

Mac Address Table

Vlan

Mac Address

Type

Ports

----------1
0002.557a.6fd3
DYNAMIC
Fa0/1
oooc.309e.6481
1
DYNAMIC
Fa0/2
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 2

up, line protocol is up
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 000c.30df.a281 (bia
OOOc·. 30df. a281)

up, line protocol is up
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 000c.30df.a282
000c.30df.a282)

(bia
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Switch_B#§iifjj;,;r r;i.t:ij
hostname Switch B
interface Vlanl
ip address 192.168.4.12 255.255.255.0
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
end
Experiment 4:
CiscoWorks Server:

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>~~~~~~;;!~~~
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
.00-40-96-A6-7D-64
IP Address.
192.168.4.1
Subnet Mask.
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.4.2
PC 1:

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>~B'g~!fttsii~~j
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-B7-F2
IP Address.
192.168.1.1
Subnet Mask .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.1.2
PC 2:

C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>iip"oo:ti¥:i~gS~¥.i~'.!J
Windows IP Configuration
- -Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-11-67
IP Address.
192.168.3.1
Subnet Mask.
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.3.2
Access Point:

ap#~llw~'~11.ij
Building configuration ...
version 12.2
hostname ap
interface DotllRadiol
ssid ML13.134-AP4
authentication open
guest-mode
interface BVIl
ip address 192.168.4.10 255.255.255.0
ip radius source-interface BVIl
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enable traps tty
end
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BVIl is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is BVI, address is 000b.5f55.3972
Internet address is 192.168.4.10/24

(bia 000b.45ca.61c5)

DotllRadiol is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is 802.llA Radio, address is OOOb.46ca.61c5 (bia
OOOb.46ca.61c5)
Experiment 5:
PC 1:

C: \Documents and Settings\Administrator>!}~~~~~lsijl!f!ii!
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-B7-F2
IP Address . . .
192.168.1.1
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.1.3
PC 2:

C: \Documents and Settings\Admi:p.istrator>~'p'\i~~~~g{,wfa\1
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
00-02-55-73-11-67
IP Address. . .
192.168.1.2
Subnet Mask . .
255.255.255.0
Default Gateway
192.168.1.3

CiscoWorks Server:
C:\Documents and
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
IP Address . . .
Subnet Mask . .
Default Gateway

00-02-55-73-20-24
192.168.5.1
255.255.255.0
192.168.5.3

PC 4:

C:\Documents and Settings
Windows IP Configuration
Physical Address.
IP A.ddress.

.

.

Subnet Mask . .
Default Gateway

00-02-55-73-B2-3A
192 168 5.2
255.255.255.0
192.168.5.3

AccessPoint 1:

hostname ap
interface DotllRadiol
ssid ML13.134-AP5
authentication open
-guest-mode
interface BVIl
ip address 192.168.1.10 255.255.255.0
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enabl·e. traps tty
end

66

BVIl is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is BVI, address is 0013.la32.97eb (bia 0011.20ee.d2bd)
Internet address is 192.168.1.10/24

DotllRadiol is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is 802.llA Radio, address is 0011.20ee.d2bd (bia
OOll. 20ee. d2bd)

Switch 1:
switchl#
Mac Address Table

Vlan

Mac Address

Type

Ports

----------0012.d96f.db47
1
DYNAMIC
Fa0/2
.0013. la32. 97eb
1
DYNAMIC
Fa0/1
0040.96a6.7df2
DYNAMIC
1
Fa0/1
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 3

FastEthernetO 1 is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 0009.b7c8.1841 (bia
0009.b7c8.1841)
switchl#
interface Vlanl
ip address 192.168.1.11 255.255.255.0
snmp-server engineID local 8000000903000009B7C81841
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
end

PIX Firewall 1:
PIXl(config)#
PIX Version 6.3(4)
interface ethernetO lOOfull
interface ethernetl lOOfull
nameif ethernetO outside securityO
nameif ethernetl inside securitylOO
hostname PIXl
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list

ACLIN
ACLIN
ACLIN
ACLIN
ACLIN

permit
permit
permit
permit
permit

icmp any any echo
icmp any host 192.168.2.99 echo-reply
tcp any host 192.168.2.99 eq WWW
icmp any host 192.168.2.98 echo-reply
tcp any host 192.168.2.98 eq WWW

ip address outside 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0
ip address inside 192.168.1.3 255.255.255.0
static (inside,outside) 192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 o.o
static- (inside, out::·side) 192 .168. 2. 98 192 .168 .1. 2 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
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access-group ACLIN in interface outside
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.2 1
snmp-server host inside 192.168.5.1
snmp-server community public
snmp-server enable traps
end
PIXl(config)#
outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.2.2 1 OTHER static
inside 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.3 1 CONNECT static
outside 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.1 1 CONNECT static
PIXl(config)#
2 in use, 3 most used
TCP out 192.168.4.98:80 in 192.168.1.1:1053 idle 0:00:27 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
TCP out 192.168.4.99:80 in 192.168.1.1:1055 idle 0:00:06 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
PIXl (config) #
2 in use, 3 most used
TCP out 192.168.4.99:80 in 192.168.1.2:1063 idle 0:00:19 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
TCP out 192.168.4.98:80 in 192.168.1.2:1065 idle 0:00:03 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
PIXl(config)#
2 in use, 2 most used
Global 192.168.2.99 Local 192 .168 .1.1
Global 192.168.2.98 Local 192.168.1.2
PIXl(config)#
outside 192.168.2.2 0009.b765.29a0
inside 192.168.1.1 0002.5573.163c
inside 192.168.1.2 0002.557a.6e7e
PIXl(config)#
access-list cached ACL log flows: total O, denied O (deny-flow-max
1024)
alert-interval 300
access-list ACLIN; 5 elements
access-list ACLIN line 1 permit icmp any any echo (hitcnt=29)
access-list ACLIN line 2 permit icmp any host 192.168.2.99 echo-reply
(hi tcnt=3 6)
access-list ACLIN line 3 permit tcp any host 192.168.2.99 eg www
(hitcnt=l)
access-list ACLIN line 4 permit icmp any host 192.168.2.98 echo-reply
(hitcnt=8)
access-list ACLIN line 5 permit tcp any host 192.168.2.98 eg www
(hitcnt=l)
PIXl(config)#
static (inside,
192.168.2.99 192.168.1.1 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
static (inside,outside) 192.168.2.98 192.168.1.2 netmask
255.255.255.255 0 0
PIXl(config)#
11
interface ethernetl 11
is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db47
IP address 192. °1'68 .1. 3, subnet mask 255. 255. 255. O
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PIXl(config)#
interface ethernetO "outside" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db46
IP address 192.168.2.1, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
Router 1:

Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B BGP
R
C
C

192.168.4.0/24 [120/1] via 192.168.3.2, 00:00:25, Serial0/0
192.168.2.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
192.168.3.0/24 is directly connected, Serial0/0

hostname routerl
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.0
interface FastEthernet0/1
ip address 192.168.2.2 255.255.255.0
router rip
network 192.168.2.0
network 192.168.3.0
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enable traps tty
end

Protocol Address
Internet 192.168.2.99
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.2.2
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.3.2
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.3.1
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.2.1
FastEthernet0/1

Age (min)
34

34

15

Hardware Addr
0012.d96f.db46

Type
ARPA

000c.309e.6481

ARPA

oooc.30e2.c620

ARPA

000c.309e.6480

ARPA

0012. d96f. db46

ARPA

Interface

routerl#~,~~lffil~S§A~I!
FastEthernet0/1 is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6481 (bia 000c.309e.6481)
Internet address is 192.168.2.2/24
routerl#wlt~~,,-~m:~ey~r~
FastEthernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.309e.6480 (bia 000c.309e.6480)
Internet address is 192.168.3.1/24
Access Point 2:

ap#iliwt11~1
Building configuration ...
hostname ap
interface DotllRadiol
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ssid ML13.134-AP4
authentication open
guest-mode
interface BVIl
ip address 192.168.4.10 255.255.255.0
ip radius source-interface BVIl
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enable traps tty
end

up, line protocol is up
Hardware is BVI, address is 000b.5f55.3972
Internet address is 192.168.4.10/24

(bia 000b.46ca.6lc5)

DotllRadiol is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is 802.llA Radio, address is 000b.46ca.6lc5 (bia
OOOb.46ca.6lc5)
Switch 2:

Mac Address Table

Vlan

Mac Address

Type

Ports

----------0002.5573.2024
DYNAMIC
1
Fa0/3
0012.d96f.db39
DYNAMIC
Fa0/2
1
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 2

is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is Fast Ethernet, address is 000c.30df.a282
oooc.30df.a282)

(bia

switch2#
interface Vlanl
ip address 192.168.5.11 255.255.255.0
snmp-server engineID local 800000090300000C30DFA281
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
end
PIX Firewall 2:
PIX2(config)#
out 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.4.2 1 OTHER static
out 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.4.1 1 CONNECT static
inside 192.168.5.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.5.3 1 CONNECT static
PIX2·(config) #
PIX Version 6.3(4)
interface ethernetO lOOfull
interface ethernetl lOOfull
nameif etherneto out securityO
nameif etherneti 1nside securitylOO
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hostname PIX2
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list
access-list

ACLIN
ACLIN
ACLIN
ACLIN
ACLIN

permit
permit
permit
permit
permit

tcp any host 192.168.4.99 eq www
icmp any any echo
icmp any host 192.168.4.99 echo-reply
tcp any host 192.168.4.98 eq www
icmp any host 192.168.4.98 echo-reply

ip address out 192.168.4.1 255.255.255.0
ip address inside 192.168.5.3 255.255.255.0
static (inside,out) 192.168.4.99 192.168.5.1 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0
static (inside,out) 192.168.4.98 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0
access-group ACLIN in interface out
route out 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.4.2 1
snmp-server host inside 192.168.5.1
snmp-server community public
snmp-server enable traps
end
PIX2(config)#
3 in use, 3 most used
TCP out 192.168.2.99:80 in 192.168.5.2:1048 idle 0:00:21 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
TCP out 192.168.2.98:80 in 192.168.5.1:1054 idle 0:00:56 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
TCP out 192.168.2.98:80 in 192.168.5.2:1050 idle 0:00:06 Bytes 1255
flags UIO
PIX2(config)#
2 in use, 2 most used
Global 192.168.4.99 Local 192.168.5.1
Global 192.168.4.98 Local 192.168.5.2
PIX2(config)#
out 192.168.4.2 0009.b76f.ad60
inside 192.168.5.2 0002.5573.b23c
inside 192.168.5.l 0002.5573.098b
PIX2(config)#
static (inside;out

192.168.4.99 192.168.5.1

n~rm~Qk ?~~.?~~.?~~.?~~

O

0

static (inside,out) 192.168.4.98 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.255 0
0

PIX2(config)#
11
interface ethernetl 11
is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ether~et, address is 0012.d96f.db39
IP address 192.168.5.3, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
PIX2(config)#
interface ethernetO "out" is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is i82559 ethernet, address is 0012.d96f.db38
IP address 192.168.4.1, subnet mask 255.255.255.0
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Router 2:

router2
hostname router2
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 192.168.3.2 255.255.255.0
interface FastEthernet0/1
ip address 192.168.4.2 255.255.255.0
router rip
network 192.168.3.0
network 192.168.4.0
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server enable traps tty
end
router2
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B BGP
C
R
C

192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
192.168.2.0/24 [120/1] via 192.168.3.1, 00:00:04, Serial0/1
192.168.3.0/24 is directly connected, Serial0/1

router2#
Protocol Address
Internet 192.168.4.99
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.3.2
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.3.l
FastEthernet0/0
Internet 192.168.4.1
FastEthernet0/1
Internet 192.168.4.2
FastEthernet0/1

Age (min)
26

Hardware Addr
0012.d96f.db38

Type
ARPA

000c.30e2.c620

ARPA

38

oooc.309e.6480

ARPA

12

0012.d96f.db38

ARPA

OOOc.30e2.c621

ARPA

Interface

up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is 000c.30e2.c620 (bia 000c.30e2.c620)
Internet address is 192.168.3.2/24
up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdFE, address is OOOc.30e2.c621 (bia OOOc.30e2.c621)
Internet address is 192.168.4.2/24
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